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Many empirical studies prove that the emerging market 
economies (emes) with inflation targeting (it) regimes 
have succeeded in lowering their inflation rates. Calderón 
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003a, 2003b) showed that the it 
countries (iters) in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
been able to systematically reduce both inflation rates 
and inflation-target misses after adopting this monetary 
regime. Lin and Ye (2009) obtained a similar result 
using a variety of propensity score matching methods 
in 13 developing countries. Corbo, Landerrechte and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) and Gonçalves and Salles 
(2008) discovered that, compared with non-targeters 
(niters), developing countries adopting the it framework 
experienced greater drops not only in inflation but also 
in output growth volatility. Valdés (2007) found similar 
results in Chile. Batini and Laxton (2007) and the 
International Monetary Fund (imf) (2005 and 2006) report 
even larger macroeconomic benefits in terms of lower 
and less volatile inflation, as well as lower volatility of 
interest rates, exchange rates, international reserves and 
output growth, when compared with countries that have 
not adopted it. Finally, Brito and Bystedt (2010) also find 
that it reduces inflation, inflation volatility and output 
growth volatility in emes, although the effects are less 
strong and significant than noted in previous literature.
The final results of it hinge for the most part upon the 
capability of it to strengthen credibility and to decrease 
inflation expectations in developing countries.1 Proponents 
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1  A similar debate exists in the literature concerning the suitability of it 
regimes in transition economies. On the one hand, Jonás and Mishkin 
(2005) and Hrncir and Smidkova (2003), for instance, believe that, 
although inflation-targeting central banks face particular difficulties in 
these countries (such as predicting inflation under increased uncertainty 
and suffering more frequent shocks), such regimes could still deliver 
important benefits in terms of increased control over expectations 
and short-term flexibility of monetary policy. On the other hand, 
Kvasnicka (2000) considers that it regimes are not advisable for 
transition economies because such economies are strongly affected 
of it offer an optimistic view on the grounds that the pote 
ntial of credibility gains is high since developing countries 
generally start implementing this regime with very weak 
institutions. Svensson (1997), Mishkin (1999), King 
(2005), imf (2006) and Blejer and others (2001) advised 
the adoption of it regimes in emes during imf structural 
adjustment programmes. Other distrustful authors claim 
that some kind of “original sin” in institutions and 
structural drawbacks in policy implementation preclude 
the central banks of these economies from reducing 
inflation expectations consistently (Calvo and Mishkin, 
2003; Sims, 2005; Blanchard, 2005). 
The empirical analysis of the macroeconomic 
impact of it requires solving the endogeneity bias created 
by the adoption of an it regime. To our knowledge, 
Brito and Bystedt (2010) is the only work to address 
this problem explicitly and seriously in the context of 
emerging market economies. For the period 1980-2006, 
these authors analysed the impact of it on inflation and 
output growth in 13 it developing countries, using as 
benchmarks several control groups from a sample of 33 
non-it emerging economies. They applied the two-step 
s-gmm panel estimator, which controls for the time-
varying bias problem and for the endogeneity of the it 
regime. Their findings indicate that the emes with it 
strategies have been successful with disinflation, but at 
the cost of hindering output growth.
In this paper, we tackle and solve the endogeneity 
problem by estimating (after the application of two 
conventional regression tests) a treatment effects model, 
following the procedure suggested by Heckman (1979), 
Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003). This method is 
particularly suited for evaluating the impact of qualitative 
variables, such as the adoption of it, on other variables 
that are easily quantified. It consists of estimating a probit 
relationship aimed at assessing the extent to which some 
variables picked out from theory and from the empirical 
literature affect the probability of adopting an it regime, 
and outcome equations that relate some macroeconomic 
variables with their main determinants, among which 
the adoption of it is a key variable. 
by uncertainties and instability in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. In the framework of eight developed countries, Yigit (2010) 
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Our analysis focuses on five Latin American countries 
that adopted an it regime by the end of 2007, taking 
another set of 10 non-it Latin American economies as a 
benchmark for the years 1980-2007. For several reasons, 
Latin America does indeed provide an interesting case 
study for assessing the effects of it on emerging market 
economies. First, the five Latin American targeters have 
been the forerunners of it in the worldwide group of 
emerging market economies. Second, choosing a panel 
composed of only Latin American countries allows 
for minimizing economic and institutional differences 
between the members of the panel; this helps to better 
isolate the effects of adopting it. In fact, we work with 
a group of economies that are more homogeneous than 
those usually considered in the literature.
Our panel treatment methodology is not distorted 
by time-varying bias because all countries of the group 
started applying full-fledged it around 2000, which is 
also the year in which our analysis of the treatment effects 
begins. Small differences in dates of it adoption cannot 
bias the results significantly. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the Latin American countries in our sample 
have been affected by different time trends since 2000. 
There are also reasons to believe that our methodology 
correctly addresses the self-selection problem because the 
variables that led each country to adopt the it framework 
are determined endogenously in our model. We can assert, 
then, that the econometric treatment effects methodology 
contributes to improving the inference of the causal effect 
of it on the selected macroeconomic variables, compared 
with other methodologies that do not correctly deal with 
the time-varying bias and the self-selection problem.
The paper is structured in four sections. After this 
introduction, in section II we perform a descriptive 
analysis using all three of the candidate variables (rate of 
inflation, short-term interest rate and economic growth) 
for the two groups of countries, in order to intuitively 
grasp the impact of it on them. In section III we apply 
three different econometric tests to rigorously investigate 
the impact of it on the level and variability of those 
three variables. Finally, section IV summarizes the main 
empirical findings.
The results that we derive from the empirical 
analysis may be summarized as follows. The regression 
and treatment effects tests coincide to show that it has 
decisively contributed to reducing both average levels 
and variability of domestic inflation and short-term 
interest rates and to decreasing variability of gdp growth 
compared with alternative monetary regimes during the 
period under study. Although the final effect on the level 
of gdp growth cannot be clearly discerned —which 
is not surprising given the relatively short length of 
the observed period— our results point out that the it 
regime has improved macroeconomic results compared 
with other policy regimes that are not equipped with an 
explicit inflation expectations anchor.
II
Descriptive Analysis
In this section we apply descriptive statistics to get a 
first impression of the likely macroeconomic effects 
of the adoption of it in five Latin American countries: 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The general 
methodology is as follows: (i) for each ITer, we compare 
the results relating to some relevant macroeconomic 
variables during the pre-it era with those of the post-it 
period of the same country, and (ii) we compare the 
results (for the same set of variables) that each group of 
countries (iters and niters) obtained during the post-it 
period of the first group. The group of niters selected 
as a benchmark comprises 10 countries: Argentina, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. Both groups 
of countries are in Latin America because this enables 
us to compare areas that share not only an analogous 
geographical context but also similar degrees of economic 
and institutional development.
As a prior step, it is useful to describe the exchange-
rate regimes in force in the countries of the sample over 
the entire period of analysis. The 15 selected countries 
offer not only a variety of different exchange-rate 
regimes but also a number of very different monetary 
arrangements. Table 1 shows the exchange-rate regimes 
declared by these countries to the imf in three different 
years: 1985, 2002 and 2007. As can be seen, the general 
tendency is a switch from intermediate regimes towards 
corner solutions: while in 1985 12 of the 15 countries 
had exchange-rate regimes that represented intermediate 
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TABLE 1




Brazil Intermediate Flotation Flotation (if)*
Chile Intermediate Flotation Flotation (if)*
Colombia Intermediate Flotation Flotation (mf)*
Mexico Intermediate Flotation Flotation (if)*
Peru Intermediate Flotation Flotation (mf)*
niter countries Exchange-rate regimes
Argentina Intermediate Flotation Flotation (mf)
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Flotation Intermediate Intermediate (cp)
Costa Rica Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate (cp)
Dominican Republic Intermediate Intermediate Flotation (mf)
Ecuador Intermediate Rigid peg Rigid peg (ns)
El Salvador Intermediate Rigid peg Rigid peg (ns)
Panama Rigid peg Rigid peg Rigid peg (ns)
Paraguay Intermediate Flotation Flotation (mf)
Uruguay Flotation Flotation Flotation (mf)
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Intermediate Flotation Rigid peg (cf)
Source: A. Berg, E. Borensztein and P. Mauro, “An evaluation of monetary regime options for Latin America”, imf Working Paper, N° 02/211, 
Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 2002; and Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2002, p.25) and International Monetary Fund 
(imf), (“De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks”, April 2008). [online] http://www.imf.org/
external/np/mfd/er/2008/eng/0408.htm.
Note: cp, crawling peg; if, independently floating; mf, managed float with no pre-announced exchange-rate path; ns, no separate legal 
tender; cf, conventional fixed peg.
arrangements, by 2007 the share had fallen to 2 out of 
15. According to the empirical study by Calderón and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2003b), the structural break took place 
in 1998, immediately after the Asian crisis.
Among the nine countries with floating currency 
regimes in 2007, three operate independent and free 
exchange-rate flexibility and the other six exhibit managed 
floats with no pre-announced exchange-rate path. The 
three central banks with independent floating regimes 
belong to the it group, and they do not use systematic 
interventions to dampen fluctuations of their exchange rate.
1. inflation targeting in Latin America
To date, five Latin American countries have adopted 
inflation targeting strategies with more or less intensity. 
Mishkin and Savastano (2002) present a detailed 
analysis of the characteristics of these regimes up to 
2001. Table 2 updates, for the five countries, the main 
features of the it regimes adopted. The starting dates 
within parentheses indicate when the central bank began 
to publish inflation reports. 
Chile is the first country (January 1991) that gave 
independence to its central bank and announced price 
stability as one of its primary objectives. As a result, the 
domestic inflation rate decreased gradually. However, 
it was not until 1999 that the central bank explicitly 
announced a multi-year target for inflation. In May 
2000 the central bank began to issue inflation reports 
in which it published its baseline inflation forecasts. 
Healthy public finances and a sound financial system 
are two key features of the Chilean economy that have 
supported a full-fledged inflation targeting regime in 
this country.
In 1999 Brazil started a monetary policy regime 
with all the key ingredients of an it regime. The central 
bank immediately published a comprehensive inflation 
report. Since then the independence of the central bank 
of Brazil has been enhanced and increased in order to 
ensure the success of the it scheme. Moreover, fiscal 
deficits must be brought back to levels that remove any 
possibility of fiscal dominance.
In 1991 the central bank of Colombia started to 
announce explicit numerical targets for the one-year rate 
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of inflation. This anti-inflationary strategy failed until 
1999 because the central bank continued to give priority 
to other objectives, especially output stabilization and 
external competitiveness, whenever these goals were 
threatened by the inflation target. Furthermore, the budget 
deficit was not sufficiently controlled until that year. 
The strategy changed positively in January 1999 when 
the central bank of Colombia began to publish inflation 
reports. Moreover, in September 1999 the exchange rate 
began to float freely. The announcement of multi-year 
inflation targets since October 2000 has also contributed 
to the success of the new regime in the past few years.
The central bank of Mexico waited until it acquired 
sufficient anti-inflationary credibility to put in place a 
full-fledged it regime. This occurred in January 1999, 
when the annual rate of inflation (12.3%) was below 
the 13% target. In April 2000 the Mexican central bank 
started to publish its monthly report on inflation.
The announcement of it in 1994 initiated a period 
of anti-inflationary success in Peru. The inflation rate fell 
from levels over 20% in 1994 to 3% in 2001. However, 
Peru’s monetary authorities did not gain sufficient 
credibility during that period because their monetary 
framework lacked many of the crucial features of an it 
regime. Some of these features were the announcement 
of multi-year inflation targets, publication of inflation 
reports and mechanisms for making the central bank 
accountable. By June 2002 these drawbacks were almost 
completely corrected, and monetary policy started to 
fulfil the key requirements of a true it regime.
2. macroeconomic results
In order to get a first insight as to the extent to which 
an it regime may have contributed to improving 
macroeconomic results in the five incumbent Latin 
American countries, we investigate the results in terms 
of inflation, bank deposit interest rates and gdp growth. 
We apply descriptive calculus for both time series and 
cross-section variables of the two groups of countries.
(a) Descriptive analysis of time series variables
We assembled a database of monthly data for the 
relatively long period from January 1981 to December 
2007 and computed annualized rates for three relevant 
variables: inflation, short-term interest rate (bank deposits 
maturing in one year) and gdp growth. For reasons of 
data availability, the rates of gdp growth were calculated 
TABLE 2
Latin America (five countries): inflation-targeting regimes of individual countries
Country Starting date and main features
Brazil Starting date: June 1999 (September 1999). 
Inflation targets: 8% ± 2% (1999), 6% ± 2% (2000), 4% ± 2% (2006-2007).
Inflation report and announcement of multi-year inflation targets. 
Weak fiscal position and relatively sound financial system. 
Chile Starting date: January 1991 (May 2000).
Inflation targets: 15%-20% (1991), 3.5% (2000), 2%-4% (2001-2007).
Inflation report and announcement of multi-year targets.
Strong fiscal position and relatively sound financial system. 
Colombia Starting date: January 1991 (January 1999).
Inflation targets: 22% (1991), 10% (2000), 4.5% ± 0.5% (2006), 4% ± 0.5% (2007). 
Inflation report and announcement of multi-year targets.
Strong fiscal position and relatively sound financial system.
Mexico Starting date: January 1996 (April 2000).
Inflation targets: 20.5% (1996), <10% (2000), 3% ± 1% (2003-2007).
Inflation report and announcement of multi-year targets.
Strong fiscal position and relatively sound financial system at today.
Peru Starting date: January 1994 (June 2002).
Inflation targets: 15%-20% (1994), 3.5%-4% (2000), 2.5% ± 1% (2002-2006), 2% ± 1% (2007).
Inflation report and announcement of multi-year targets.
Weak fiscal position, but relatively sound financial system.
Source: The authors, on the basis of economic reports from the respective central banks.
Note: The dates in parentheses correspond to when the central banks published their first inflation reports.
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using quarterly observations. The sample is split in two 
periods in each country, taking into account the starting 
date of the it regime. The starting it date is the moment 
at which the central bank first published an inflation 
report. The five iters started a complete it regime between 
January 1999 and June 2002 (see table 3).2 
The details concerning the length of each subsample 
are presented in table 3. Sample 1, corresponding to the 
period preceding it, excludes the years of hyperinflation 
in each country. Sample 2 encompasses the period after 
the adoption of it. We consider hyperinflation to be 
rates of inflation over the 95th percentile in the inflation 
distribution of the entire sample of Latin American 
countries. 
2  Other authors argue that it took several attempts for full-fledged 
it regimes to be introduced. The suggested starting dates are not 
coincident between authors but are relatively close. Thus, according 
to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), the stationary target period 
started at some moment between January 2001 and January 2003, 
whereas Batini and Laxton (2007) consider that the date was between 
the second quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of 2002. 
Table 4 shows the average and standard deviation 
of the monthly rates of inflation computed over twelve 
months (annual basis) for each subsample and country. 
As far as level values are concerned, it is clearly apparent 
that the inflation rate decreased sharply between the 
first and the second subperiods in each country. Brazil 
reaped the best results, even without taking into account 
the huge inflation numbers of its hyperinflation years. 
On average, in the second period the inflation rate fell to 
9% of the value recorded during the first sample period.
As regards inflation rate variability, the third and 
fourth columns of table 4 illustrate reductions of a similar 
order as the average in each country. The fall in variability 
is especially pronounced in the countries with highest 
initial inflation levels. To sum up, the improvement in 
inflation is quite remarkable in all countries and has 
taken place in both levels and variability.
Table 5 provides information that is similar to 
that set out in the preceding table, but referring to the 
annualized nominal interest rate on bank deposits. As 
can be seen, both the average levels and the standard 
deviations also decrease substantially in each country. For 
TABLE 3
Latin America (five countries): subsamples for each country
Country Sample 1: before it Hyperinflation period it start Sample 2: after it
Brazil Jan. 1981-Aug. 1999 Feb. 1987-Mar. 1995 Sept. 1999 Sept. 1999-Dec. 2007
Chile Jan. 1981-Apr. 2000 May 2000 May 2000-Dec. 2007
Colombia Jan. 1981-Dec. 1998 Jan. 1999 Jan. 1999-Dec. 2007
Mexico Jan. 1981-Mar. 2000 Apr. 2000 Apr. 2000-Dec. 2007
Peru Jan. 1981-May 2002 July 1988-July 1991 June 2002 June 2002-Dec. 2007
Source: The authors, on the basis of economic reports from the respective central banks.
Note: Sample 1 comprises the years before the adoption of it. Sample 2 comprises the years after the adoption of it. Sample 1 excludes 
the years of hyperinflation. Hyperinflation includes the rates of monthly inflation within the 5% group of observations with the highest 
rates of inflation.
TABLE 4
Latin America (five countries): inflation by country
(Annualized monthly observations, percentages)
Country
Average level of inflation on annual basis Standard deviation
Before it After it Before it After it
Brazil 97.00  7.32 81.40  3.35
Chile 15.43 3.07 8.42 1.39
Colombia 23.32 6.93 4.34  2.26
Mexico 45.73 5.05 39.89 1.67
Peru 36.96 2.11 63.18  1.13
Average 47.85 4.29 38.08 1.53
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
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the countries that we include in the empirical analysis, 
it clearly contributes to easing the task of monetary 
policy and to reducing tensions in domestic money 
and credit markets. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that it creates a favourable environment for investment 
decisions, which in turn should contribute to increasing 
economic growth in the medium and long term.
Table 6 reports the same information for annualized 
economic growth, computed with quarterly observations 
of real gdp. It seems that the adoption of an it regime 
comes with a clear reduction in the dispersion of growth 
outcomes, but its effects on the level of growth are 
ambiguous: the positive effects are observed only in 
Brazil and Peru.
(b) Descriptive analysis of cross-section variables
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the results derived from the adoption of the it regime, 
it is useful to compare the macroeconomic performance 
of two groups of Latin American economies: countries 
with it, and countries without it. In the first group we 
include the five countries considered in the preceding 
section; the second group is composed of ten countries: 
Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Panama, Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 
Uruguay. We compute cross-sectional monthly values 
for the inflation and interest rates and quarterly rates of 
change for gdp growth for the period January 2000 to 
December 2007 for the two groups of countries. 
Figure 1 presents the results for the three variables 
for the two groups of countries. As can be seen, the 
results support the conclusions of the preceding analysis 
based on time series variables: compared with countries 
that did not adopt it regimes during the sample period, 
those that engineered it obtained (i) a lower and less 
volatile rate of inflation; (ii) lower variability in gdp 
growth; and (iii) much lower levels and variability in 
short-term interest rates. The net effects on average gdp 
growth are unclear.
TABLE 5
Latin America (five countries): annualized interest rate on bank deposits 
(Annualized monthly observations, percentages)
Country
Average rate of interest Standard deviation
Before it After it Before it After it
Brazil 132.47 16.80 133.56 3.54
Chile 23.02  4.57 13.87  2.06
Colombia  31.16 10.19 4.35 4.82
Mexico 36.78 4.10 24.85 1.83
Peru 17.21  2.96 26.76  0.40
Average 86.81 10.36 40.22 3.40
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
TABLE 6
Latin America (five countries): gdp growth
(Annualized quarterly observations, percentages)
Country
Average rate of gdp growth Standard deviation
Before it After it Before it After it
Brazil 2.02 3.18 2.45 1.64
Chile 6.28 4.31 3.66 1.26
Colombia 3.09 2.93 1.34 3.35
Mexico 3.36 2.74 3.59 2.16
Peru 3.99 6.08 4.21 1.69
Average 3.75 3.85 3.05 2.02
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of statistical data from the website of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (eclac).
Note: Numbers are annual rates of gdp growth on the basis of quarterly observations. Sample: first quarter of 1992 to fourth quarter of 2007.
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1. Time series regressions
In this section we perform regressions with dummy 
variables, following the Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
methodology, to assess whether the levels and variability 
of three variables (the rate of inflation, the short-run 
interest rate, and gdp growth) have significantly changed 
between the pre-it and post-it periods of the iters.
For this purpose, we estimate the following equation:
 xi,t = αi + δiFi,t + γixLAT,t + θiGBi,t + εi,t (1)
Where xi,t is the variable under analysis of country i 
corresponding to period t, and Fi,t is a dummy that takes 
value 1 during the periods where country i applies it 
and value 0 during the rest of the sample. Parameter δi 
measures the effect of it on the variable xi,t.
Equation (1) includes two control variables in order 
to isolate the pure effect of it. The first one, xLAT,t, stands 
for the average of xi,t of a large group of Latin American 
countries. It is included to avoid the biased estimations 
of parameter δi that arise when the variable xi,t converges 
towards a common mean in the sample of countries. For 
instance, if xi,t is the inflation rate in Chile, the observed 
reduction in the value of this variable between the 
pre- and post-it periods could, in fact, be created by a 
general trend in the entire group of countries and not by 
the implementation of it. The second control variable, 
GBi,t, captures the strength of the public budget and is 
measured by the ratio of proceeds over expenditures of 
the central government. 
Ball and Sheridan (2005) used a similar methodology 
to analyse the effects of it in a group of industrialized 
countries, but without conducting separate estimations 
for each country.
We first estimate equation (1) for the level and 
standard deviation of the rate of inflation. Inflation is 
measured by the annual rate of variation in the consumer 
price index, and its variability is approximated by its 
standard deviation. In order to more accurately determine 
the incidence of it on these variables, we perform 
regressions for three period samples that differ in the 
starting date of the pre-it period. The first one starts in 
January 1981, the second begins in January 1992, and the 
third starts in January 1996. If the implementation of it 
significantly changes the evolution of the variables (in a 
FIGURE 1
Average and variability of inflation, economic growth and interest rates in it and 
non-it countries 
(Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2007)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on statistical data from the website of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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TABLE 7
Latin America (five countries): inflation rate for three periods
Country
Inflation rate 
Jan. 1981 - Dec. 2007 Jan. 1992 - Dec. 2007 Jan. 1996 - Dec. 2007

































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note: Monthly data. For each country:
- The first row shows the estimated value of δi.
- The second row shows the t-statistics under the null hypothesis H0: δi = 0. The significance levels are 1%(*) and 5%(**), respectively.
- The third and fourth rows show the R2 statistics and the number of observations, respectively. 
- Cells in rows five and six containing numbers in italics correspond to the cases where the government budget is statistically significant. 
Row five shows the estimated value of δi and row six shows its t-statistics. Where no results are given for this estimation the government 
budget is not statistically significant.
similar way as a structural change), we would expect that 
the effects of it will be stronger and more statistically 
significant for longer pre-it subperiods. 
Table 7 shows the regression results for the inflation 
rate of each it country. The first two columns offer the 
estimation of δi for the level and the standard deviation 
of inflation, corresponding to the longest period sample, 
January 1981 to December 2007. The control variable 
GBi,t is not included due to the lack of monthly data 
for many observations prior to 1992. According to 
the estimated values of these parameters and of their 
t statistics, it has been very effective in reducing both 
inflation and its variability in each country. For instance, 
in the case of Chile, the values δChile = -6.83 and δChile 
= -1.36 mean that the inflation rate and its variability 
declined by 6.83 percentage points and 1.36 percentage 
points on average, respectively, in the post-it period 
compared with the pre-it period. The t statistics (-8.19 
and -6.14) allow us to clearly reject the null hypothesis 
of non-significance in each of these estimations. 
Columns three to six of table 7 report the results 
for two shorter periods including the variable GBi,t in 
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the regressions. When GBi,t is statistically significant, 
the estimated value of δi and its t-statistics are reported 
in italic numbers in rows five and six, respectively, for 
the corresponding countries. For comparison purposes, 
in those cases we also performed the same regressions 
excluding GBi,t, with the results that appear in the first 
and second rows for each country. As can be seen, except 
for the two shorter periods in Brazil, δi is always negative 
and statistically significant in regressions with the level 
of inflation and also in most regressions with inflation 
variability. Moreover, the inclusion of GBi,t generally 
improves the statistical significance of parameter δi. 
To sum up, the regression results indicate that both 
the level and variability of inflation have been negatively 
affected by the adoption of the it regime.
Table 8 shows the results of the regressions for the 
annualized rate of interest of bank deposits calculated with 
monthly observations. For reasons of data availability, 
the estimations are restricted to the shorter periods, from 
January 1992 to December 2007 and from January 1996 
to December 2007. 
We observe that the adoption of it led to a significant 
reduction in both the level and variability of the nominal 
interest rate, except for interest rate variability in Brazil 
TABLE 8
Latin America (five countries): interest rate
Country
Interest rate
Jan. 1992 - Dec. 2007 Jan. 1996 - Dec. 2007

























































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note: Monthly data. For each country:
- The first row shows the estimated value of δi.
- The second row shows the t-statistics under the null hypothesis H0: δi = 0. 
- The significance levels are 1%(*), 5%(**) and 10%(***), respectively.
- The third and fourth rows show the R2 statistics and the number of observations, respectively. 
- Cells in rows five and six containing numbers in italics correspond to the cases where the government budget is statistically significant.
- Row five shows the estimated value of δi and row six shows its t-statistics. Where no results are given for this estimation the government 
budget is not statistically significant. 
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during the first period. As in the preceding table, the 
results with the inclusion of GBi,t (with numbers in 
italics) are reported only when the government budget 
is statistically significant. In those cases, GBi,t clearly 
improves the statistical quality of the results.
Table 9 reports the results of the regression for gdp 
growth on a quarterly basis. Estimations are limited to 
the two shorter samples for reasons of data availability. 
Since the inclusion of GBi,t delivered non-statistically 
significant estimations, the corresponding results are 
not reported in the table. As can be seen, in the majority 
of cases it significantly reduces the variability of gdp 
growth. However, results concerning average growth are 
less conclusive. In some cases, the impact is positive 
(Brazil and Peru during the period 1996-2007), but in 
most cases it is non-significant or even negative (Chile, 
1992-2007, and Mexico, 1996-2007). 
2. Panel regressions 
In this section we perform panel regressions that include 
one dummy deemed to capture the differences in the 
macroeconomic results between iters and niters. 
Consider the following equation:
 xi,t = α + δFi,t + εi,t (2)
Where xi,t stands for the interest variable, and Fi,t is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the observed 
data from it countries and the value 0 for data from nit 
economies. The parameter δ measures the difference 
(on average) between the xi,t values of the two groups 
of countries. 
We run regressions for the three variables of interest 
—the rate of inflation, the bank deposit interest rate and 
gdp growth— using monthly and quarterly data over 
the period from January 2000 to December 2007. The 
variables are defined and measured in the same way as 
in section II.2(a). 
Table 10 shows the results for all the regressions. 
As can be seen, the estimated values of δ always have 
the appropriate sign and are statistically significant (at 
the 1% level) except for the level of gdp growth. The 
results referring to the rate of inflation (presented in the 
first two columns) indicate that the it group obtained an 
average rate of inflation 4.95 percentage points lower 
TABLE 9
Latin America (five countries): gdp growth
Country
gdp growth
1992:QI - 2007:QIV 1996:QI - 2007:QIV

















































































Source: Statistical data from the website of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac).
Note: Quarterly data. The first row shows the estimated value of δi.
The second row presents the t-statistics under the null hypothesis H0: δi = 0. The significance levels are: 1%(*) and 5%(**), respectively.
The third and fourth rows show the R2 statistics and the number of observations, respectively.
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than that of the nit group. The it group also improved 
the results concerning the variability of the inflation rate: 
the standard deviation decreased by 1.71 percentage 
points with respect to the niters. As regards the nominal 
interest rate (third and fourth columns), the improvements 
afforded by the it regime are also evident in terms of 
both lower levels and decreased variability.
The results referring to gdp growth deserve additional 
comments. First, they are obtained using quarterly 
data (480 observations). Second, although the impact 
parameter has the correct sign, the estimated value is 
very small and not statistically significant: t-statistics 
equal to 0.30. Third, it clearly decreases gdp growth 
variability, since the impact variable has a negative 
sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. it 
contributed to reducing growth rate variability by an 
average of 0.37 percentage points in iters compared 
with niters. These results fully confirm our findings 
in the time regression analysis of gdp growth effects, 
where the advantage of iters compared with niters was 
detected in variability but not in levels. 
3.  Treatment effects
The way that the econometric tests applied so far 
assess the influence of qualitative variables, such as the 
adoption of it, may suffer from endogeneity problems. 
To overcome this difficulty, in this section we estimate 
a model of treatment effects that is especially designed 
to investigate the impact of non-observable variables on 
quantitative ones and to solve the self-selection bias. We 
apply the model suggested by Heckman (1979), Maddala 
(1983) and Greene (2003) to estimate the effects of it on 
the mean and variability of the three interest variables. 
The method consists of two sequential estimations. We 
first estimate a probit equation, which aims at assessing 
the extent to which some variables proposed in the 
empirical literature affect the probability of adopting 
an it regime, and then three outcome equations that 
relate each interest variable with its main determinants, 
including the adoption of it. The model is as follows:
 yit = β'xit + δITit + uit  (3)
 ITit = 
   1  if  IT *  it > 0 (4)   0 otherwise
 IT *  it = γ'wit + ζit (5)
Equation (3) is the outcome equation valid for each 
interest variable yit. It shows that yit (the value of y in 
country i during quarter t ) has two main determinants: 
vector xit, which includes a set of observable variables 
liable to affect yit, and a dichotomy variable, ITit, which 
takes the value 1 if country i in period t is an iter, and 
the value 0 otherwise, as indicated by the expression (4). 
Regarding the components of vector xit, we have selected 
four variables included in standard macroeconomic 
models, i.e. gross formation of fixed capital (gffkit), 
international openness (openit), the growth rate of the 
money supply (m1) and the public deficit as a percentage 
of gdp (defit). The parameter δ measures the effect of 
adopting it on variable yit. 
Columns two to four of table 11 describe the 
hypothesized signs of the effects of the exogenous 
TABLE 10
Cross-section regressions




















1 440 1 440 1 440 1 440 480 480
0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Source: Statistical data from the website of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac) and International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note: The first row shows the estimated value of δ.The numbers in parentheses show the t-statistics under the null hypothesis H0: δ = 0. The 
significance level is 1%(*). Rows three and four show the number of panel observations and the R2 statistics, respectively. The it countries 
include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The group of nit countries is made up of Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
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variables on the levels of the three endogenous ones in 
the outcome equations. As far as the nominal variables 
(inflation and interest rates) are concerned, it seems clear 
that openness should result in a drop in both nominal 
levels. Moreover, the rate of money growth is deemed 
to increase inflation and reduce short-run interest rates. 
However, there are no conclusive reasons for the sign 
of the fiscal deficit. If fiscal deficits are predominantly 
debt-financed, they should push up interest rates and 
lower inflation. But if they cause money expansions, 
effects in the opposite direction must be expected. As 
regards the effects on economic growth, the first two 
variables of vector xit are expected to impact positively. 
The favourable impact of gffkit on growth is extensively 
documented in the traditional models of economic growth, 
and the positive contribution of international openness 
to economic growth is empirically demonstrated by 
proponents of the export-led growth hypothesis (see, for 
instance, Feder, 1983; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; and 
Krugman 1987) and by the endogenous growth theory 
(Romer, 1986; Grossmann and Helpmann, 1995; and 
Alesina and Rodrick, 1999). Empirical evidence of the 
positive effects of international trade on economic growth 
for some groups of emes is provided by Hassan (2005) 
and Ekanayake, Vogel and Veeramachenemi (2003).
Equation (5) is the probit equation, establishing 
that the probability of adopting it is represented by a 
non-observed variable IT*  it, which in turn depends on 
a set of factors included in vector wit. After looking at 
the potential determinants of it that have been most 
frequently suggested in the literature —see, for instance, 
Gerlach (1999), Hu (2006), Batini and Laxton (2007) 
and Leyva (2008)— we have selected the following 
variables: (i) fiscal deficit, (ii) economic openness, 
(iii) the strength of financial development, (iv) vulnerability 
to external shocks, and (v) the amount of external 
liabilities denoted in foreign currency. 
Let us now explain how the variables included in 
the probit equation are measured, and the sign of their 
expected influence on the probability of adopting an it 
regime (see column four of table 12). The fiscal deficit 
is measured as a percentage of gdp and, as in the case of 
the outcome equation, there are no definitive arguments 
to clearly hypothesize the sign of this variable. On the 
one hand, central bank independence (an important 
ingredient of it regimes) forces governments to adopt 
more austere fiscal policies but, on the other hand, the 
adoption of it might be endogenously decided as a remedy 
for weak public budgetary practices. Consequently, 
either of the two signs may be expected. Economic 
openness is measured with the amount of imports plus 
exports as a share of gdp. Since openness increases the 
rate of pass-through from exchange-rate variations to 
domestic prices, it interferes with the control of inflation 
and discourages the central bank from adopting it. 
This is especially true in emerging market economies 
because their pass-through coefficients are higher than 
those of the industrialized countries (García-Solanes 
and Torrejón-Flores, 2010). Moreover, as emphasized 
by Mishkin (2001), Eichengreen (2002) and Willet 
(2002), increasing trade and financial openness under 
exchange-rate flexibility may cause financial instability in 
emes with it. Thus, it is reasonable to expect a negative 
relationship between openness and the probability of 
adopting it. 
The soundness, health and development of a 
financial system may be proxied by the total amount of 
bank deposits as a share of gdp. Given that this variable 
TABLE 11
Hypothesized signs in the treatment effects equations
Output equation Probit equation
Control variable Inflation rate Short-run interest rate gdp growth
gffkit +
openit – – + –
ITit – – +/-
m1  + –




Source: The authors, on the basis of conventional macroeconomic models.
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is a key element —if not a prerequisite— of it strategy, 
we may assume that it contributes to the adoption of 
it. Then, the sign of its effects on the adoption of it 
must be positive. We measure vulnerability to external 
shocks with the current account deficit. High external 
imbalances make the central bank less inclined to adopt 
it, which indicates that the sign of this variable should 
be negative. Finally, the amount of external liabilities in 
foreign currencies is measured with the stock of external 
debt denoted in foreign currency. It is easy to understand 
that, since high levels of this variable hinder the operation 
of flexible exchange rates, external liabilities reduce the 
probability of adopting it.3 Consequently, the minus 
sign is our guess.
To estimate the system (3) to (5), we may apply 
either the maximum likelihood method, or the two-step 
procedure suggested by Heckman (1979), which has been 
well explained by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003) 
and used by Edwards (2004). Given that we have chosen 
the two-step methodology, a brief explanation of it is 
in order. In the first step, we apply the probit method to 
estimate the parameter γ, which is then used in equation 
(5) to estimate the variable IT*  it. The result is applied in 
equation (4) to derive the dichotomy variable ITit. In the 
second step, we estimate the output equations. However, in 
order to obtain a consistent and non-overestimated value 
of the parameter δ in equation (3) we must incorporate 
in that equation the variable ˆλit, which is defined as the 
ratio between the density function and the accumulated 
distribution of IT f IT F ITit it it it*: ˆ ˆ / ˆλ = ( ) ( )* *  (see Greene, 
 
 
3  Although debt dollarization is a clear obstacle to it implementation, 
it does not per se preclude the use of it as an effective policy regime. 
The case of the shighly dollarized Peru is a good example, as shown 
by Leiderman, Maino and Parrado (2006).
2003, chap. 22). Consequently, we estimate the enlarged 
equation, y x ITit it it it it= + + +β δ β λ ξλ' ˆˆ , to obtain the 
values of the parameters β β δλ, ˆ and .
Table 12 reports the estimation results of the system 
(3)-(5) for the three interest variables. As far as the 
probit equation is concerned, all the variables selected 
as determinants of the probability of adopting it have 
the hypothesized sign and are statistically significant 
at the 1% level, which means that the probability of 
adopting the it regime is very well captured by the 
selected variables and is favoured by the occurrence of 
the following factors: (i) fiscal imbalances, (ii) limited 
economic openness, (iii) strength of the domestic financial 
system, (iv) low current account deficits, and (v) low 
levels of external debt. 
As regards the outcome equations, all estimations 
exhibit very good statistical quality. However, there are 
important differences between them. Thus, the level and 
variability of both inflation and short interest rates are 
very well explained by openness, money supply growth, 
public deficit and it. All these determinants exhibit the 
hypothesized signs presented in table 11. Interestingly, 
money supply growth significantly affects the interest 
rate level but not its volatility. The most relevant finding 
is that it has a clear negative and significant incidence 
in both the level and volatility of inflation and interest 
rates, confirming the results of the former sections. 
Turning now to the growth equation, the results presented 
in columns 5 and 6 of table 12 indicate that economic 
growth is favoured by gross formation of fixed capital 
and by international openness. Adoption of the it regime 
contributes significantly to lowering variability growth, 
but it does not significantly impact the level of gdp 
growth, confirming, once again, our previous findings 
in this paper. This result is unsurprising since the effects 
of it on growth should appear over time horizons longer 
that those of our samples. 
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TABLE 12
Treatment effects: the impact of inflation targeting
(2000:QI - 2007:QIV)
































































































Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480
σ 0.291
ρ 0.126
Source: Statistical data from the website of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac) and International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note: Level of significance: 1% (*); 5% (**) and 10% (***). Values within parentheses are the quartiles of the typical normal distribution 
(in the probit estimation) and the values of the t-statistics (in outcome estimations).
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In this paper we have analysed the extent to which inflation 
targeting has improved macroeconomic performance in 
a group of five Latin American countries during their 
post-it period. To evaluate the results in relative terms, 
we have taken as a benchmark 10 Latin American 
countries that share many institutional features with the 
five iters, except for the adoption of an it regime. We 
expect that geographical and institutional homogeneity 
serves to extract more clearly the specific effects of it.
In order to get a first impression of the likely results 
of it on both the average levels and the variability of 
some domestic variables, in the second section we 
performed a descriptive analysis and statistical tests 
with data for the fifteen Latin American countries. In 
the third section, we applied three different econometric 
tests to more accurately assess the impact of it. In the 
first two econometric tests, based on time series and 
panel regressions, we used dummy variables to indirectly 
evaluate the effects of it on some macroeconomic 
variables. Since the results of these conventional tests may 
be affected by endogeneity and self-selection problems, 
in order to overcome those shortcomings we estimated 
a treatment effects model especially suited to evaluating 
the impact of qualitative variables (such as the adoption 
of it) on other variables that are easily quantified (such 
as inflation, interest rates and gdp growth). This is the 
main and original technical contribution of this paper, 
compared with the available literature in this field. The 
results from the three econometric tests confirm the 
descriptive impressions, signalling it as responsible for 
lower levels and variability of both inflation and short-
run interest rates and decreased growth variability in 
the countries that adopted this regime. However, none 
of the three econometric tests was able to clarify the 
effects of it on average gdp growth. In sum, we provide 
evidence that adoption of it in the five Latin American 
iters of our sample improved economic performance 
during the investigated period, probably by anchoring 
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